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Abstract 
The  American  Recovery  and  Reinvestment  Act  was  intended  to  stimulate  the  U.S. 
economy and to create jobs.  But at what cost?  In this paper, we discuss the range of 
potential benefits and costs associated with counter-cyclical fiscal policy.  Benefits and 
costs  may  be  social,  macroeconomic,  systemic,  and  budgetary.  They  may  depend 
importantly on timing and implementation.  There may be very different implications 
over the business cycle horizon and in the medium to long term.  We use simulations of 
the IHS Global Insight macro-econometric model to evaluate some of these costs and 
benefits in the U.S. economy, looking specifically at the impact of the ARRA program 
and potential alternative policies. 
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* We thank IHS Global Insight for allowing us to use their model.  All responsibility for results and 
conclusions remains with us.  
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The Employment Effects of Fiscal Policy: How Costly Are ARRA Jobs? 
 
Since the Employment Act of 1946 the U.S. Federal government has had an 
obligation, “to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power.”  
While this instruction has generally been followed during periods of recession, the effort 
made during the recent Great Recession, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 (ARRA), valued at $787 billion, far exceeded the scale and breadth of previous 
such efforts.  However, there has been considerable concern that the stimulus program 
was costly, that it was not well timed, and that it did not produce enough jobs.  The 
recovery to date has been weak, giving us what outgoing Obama economic advisor Larry 
Summers has called, “a statistical recovery and a human recession.”  At the time of this 
writing, Congress has just approved a new fiscal package that extends Bush era tax cuts 
and includes payroll tax relief, extended unemployment benefits and other stimulus.  
With public debt surging, there has been significant resistance to some aspects of the 
program. 
How large is the effect of government stimulus spending on economic activity 
and on employment?  How do these benefits compare with the scale of public spending? 
In this paper, we evaluate the cost and probable benefits of various types of stimulus 
expenditures that are either encompassed in the ARRA or that represent viable 
alternatives, with particular emphasis on the cost of creating jobs.  While a formal cost-
benefit analysis is extremely difficult, we can shed some light on the key issues and the 
relative magnitudes of policy impacts.  Through simulation analysis, we can also consider  
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the all-important issue of timing: Does stimulus reach the economy when it is needed, or 
does it potentially overheat the economy after the recession period is over?  
In the first part of the paper we consider the issues.  Specifically, we consider the 
measurement of economic effects, including the GDP multiplier and the cost of each job 
created, the speed of implementation and effectiveness, and the likely continuation of 
beneficial (and/or adverse) effects after the stimulus expenditures have ceased.   
 In second part of the paper, we use the IHS Global Insight quarterly model of the 
U.S. economy as a framework in which to examine the impact of the ARRA program and 
alternative stimulus schemes.
1  We assess the overall macroeconomic impact of the 
ARRA program, and we discuss the differences in impacts and costs across its major 
component policies and alternatives that might have been included in a broader stimulus 
bill.  With simulations, we hope also to measure the timing of the results and the impact 
after Federal government stimulus contributions have ended. The alternative stimulus 
programs to be considered range from Federal government spending and tax cuts to 
transfers to the states and individuals.  Investment tax incentives are also considered. 
We find that there are an array of potential costs and benefits that pose a 
substantial challenge to any comprehensive assessment of employment-focused 
government stimulus.  Among alternative policies, government spending on consumption 
and investment have both a large and potentially rapid impact on the labor market, 
although the slow implementation during the ARRA demonstrates that practical 
impediments may be larger than traditionally believed.  Direct transfers to states that are 
targeted at retaining jobs, a key component of the ARRA, have potentially large and rapid 
                                                           
1 Other recent studies aimed at assessing the prospective or actual effects of the ARRA program include the 
semi-official estimates of Romer and Bernstein (2009), as well as Congressional Budget Office (2009), 
Blinder and Zandi (2010), Wilson (2010), Cogan et al. (2009), and Cogan and Taylor (2010).   
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effects, but the timing depends on how quickly they can be enacted and spent.  While the 
long-run effects of investment tax credits are more significant than changes in current 
spending or taxes, near-term job creation would be very limited.  
 
Measuring Benefits and Costs of Fiscal Policy 
Output Effects: The GDP Multiplier 
The GDP multiplier has traditionally been the way to evaluate the impact of 
government expenditure programs on the aggregate economy.  As students learn early in 
Econ 101, the multiplier can be derived from simple theoretical calculations. (Woodford, 
2010).  Unfortunately, the overly simplified presentations to which most people have 
been exposed produces a much higher value than a complete theoretical presentation or 
an evaluation through simulation of a fully articulated econometric model.  As a result, 
many people are surprised to find that when the leakages and feedbacks of an economy 
are fully elaborated the short run expenditure multipliers are in the range of 1.0 for 
transfer payments or tax reductions to 2.0 or less for expenditure increases. The typical 
multiplier obtained for government expenditures from the latest version of the Global 
Insight quarterly model is in the range of 1.8 to 1.9.  Blinder and Zandi (2010) report 
spending multipliers ranging from 1.1 to 1.7.
2   
Depending to varying degrees on the type of fiscal policy, multipliers build up 
gradually, over the span of a few quarters for expenditure programs and over a longer 
                                                           
2 There has also been a vigorous debate about the size of fiscal policy multipliers   Multiplier estimates 
from dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models are often found to be much smaller.  See, for example, 
Cogan et al. (2009), Hall (2009). Some economists have argued that multipliers are well below 1 based on 
their reading of historical experience (see e.g. Barro and Redlick, 2010).  Some discussion of these issues is 
included in Adams and Gangnes (2010) and Auerbach and Harris (2010).  
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time period for tax and transfer changes, and then recede thereafter.  We will discuss the 
timing of macroeconomic responses in the IHS Global Insight model further, below.  
 
Employment Effects 
Effects on employment follow from the impact on production activity. The impact 
of increased demand on employment depends greatly on time.  Because of the lag 
structure of employment determination with respect to changes in output, there will 
normally be small effects at first, building up to bigger impacts after output has been 
expanding for some time.  Employment impacts also vary greatly depending on the 
nature of the stimulus expenditure. Investment projects have very different labor 
requirements than road repair or transfer payments, and as we will see there may be large 
effects for programs designed explicitly to prevent large-scale layoffs.  
Changing technology can also have an impact on the extent of job creation 
associated with fiscal stimulus. In the 1930s, make work projects like WPA road building 
were largely handwork—numerous men “working” with shovels.  Today, even road 
repairs are capital intensive, using heavy machinery and two or three workmen with 
substantial skills.  The share of labor in many public construction projects is much 
smaller than it once was, making job creation more challenging.  Another structural 
factor that may affect employment responses is the flexibility of labor markets; in the 
recent downturn firms were particularly aggressive in laying off workers, and they have 
been slow to hire as the recovery has gotten underway, at least in part due to greater 
reliance on temporary employment.    
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In order to make meaningful comparisons across policies of varying magnitude, 
employment impacts can be assessed using an employment elasticity, computed as the 
percentage change in employment for each 1% of GDP increase in the policy variable. 
On the basis of the employment impact, it is possible to compute a “cost per job 
created” figure.  Such a calculation divides the number of jobs created by the value of the 
expenditure stimulus. The latter can be computed as the gross value of the stimulus, i.e. 
the direct increase in expenditure or reduction in taxes introduced into the model solution, 
or alternatively on the basis of the budgetary impact, computed using the change of 
expenditure net of increased revenues.  
Simplistic calculations based on total expenditure have been the basis for 
extravagant cost estimates by opponents of the ARRA package.  An oft-cited calculation 
by minority members on the U.S. House Appropriations Committee (2009) takes the total 
size of the ARRA package and divides this by an Administration estimate of 3 million 
jobs created or saved to arrive at a per-job cost of $275,000.  This crude estimate ignores 
the time frame over which money is paid out, as well as the endogenous response of the 
economy and government revenues to the fiscal policy.  In the first case, for example, the 
$275,000 per job estimate is two-to-three times larger than plausible because it ignores 
the fact that program costs are distributed over several years, so that the appropriate 
annual cost per job is necessarily much lower.  Secondly, the true cost in budgetary terms 
may be much lower than the nominal cost because of induced growth in the tax base.   
While the focus here is on cost, it is almost certainly the case that benefits of job 
creation are underestimated, at least in the context of a significant recession.  
Unemployment entails costs that go well beyond forgone income and output, ranging  
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from social costs such as chronic poverty and increased substance abuse, to the loss of 
human capital, what Robert Gordon and others (1973) have called, “unlearning-by-not-
doing.”
3  These side effects of unemployment may reduce welfare and productivity for 
many years to come.  In a deep and long downturn, like the one just experienced, the 
benefit from eliminating these side effects may be disproportionately large compared 
with a “normal” recession.  
 
Timing 
One of the difficulties with the ARRA program has been the delay in its 
implementation.   In general, timing issues are a key aspect of macro policy, both the 
time required to make decisions about the expenditures and their disbursement, as well as 
the timing of the macroeconomic effects.  The timing of stimulus can be decomposed into 
several components as shown in Figure 1.  Only the implementation lag and the 
multiplier lag can be determined from model simulation, since decision and disbursement 
lags are not readily modeled econometrically.  As a practical matter, it will generally also 
not be possible to distinguish the direct and the indirect effects in model simulations.  
 
                                                           
3 There is an extensive literature addressing the incidence and cost of unemployment.  While not attempting 
a comprehensive survey, we note that from the macroeconomic perspective Gordon et al. (1973), Feldstein 
(1978) and others have explored the extent to which foregone output (measured by Okun’s Law) represents 
an appropriate estimate of the welfare cost of unemployment when benefits from leisure and productive job 
search are considered.  In the tradition of Lucas (1987) and Clark et al. (1994), Douglas and Wall (2000) 
attempt to measure the welfare costs of unemployment based on revealed preference.   At the 
microeconomic level, the large literature on job displacement (see the excellent survey by Kletzer, 1998) 
examines the nature of job losers and the follow-on effects on their future employment and earning.   A 
number of papers looking at unemployment cost side effects are referenced in Trades Union Congress 
(2010).   
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Figure 1. Timing of Stimulus Program 
 
     decision lag              disbursement lag       implementation  lag     multiplier lag 
0  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  1     
Time (in quarters) 
 
We divide the time delays according to their origins as follows: 
•  Decision lag—the time lag associated with reaching the political decision, 
presumably up to the passage and effectiveness of legislation.  This lag is 
unpredictable, at least for the economist, since it depends on the political process. 
(Note that monetary decisions made by the central bank are likely to have smaller 
lags than fiscal decision made by legislative authorities.) 
 
•  Disbursement lag—the time lags associated with disbursement of funds.  
Traditionally the assumption used to be that these lags would be short.  Recently, 
the lags associated with ARRA have been quite long, in part because of allocation 
of funds to and by the states. 
 
•  Implementation lag—this lag involves the time until additional funds spent result 
directly in additional economic activity.  The time delays involved here may be 
short but may differ between additional production activity and employment. 
 
•  Multiplier or indirect impact lag involves the response of other parts of the 
economy to the direct increase in expenditures. 
 
 
Hard Questions About Long-Term Effects 
An important consideration is the value of what is obtained for the expenditure.  If 
spending consists of dollar bills dropped from a helicopter (a la Friedman), the budgetary 
consequences would be dollar per dollar on a gross basis and less on a net basis, though 
the real direct economic cost would be zero since no resources, except for paper (and 
fuel) are used. If government consumption is increased, there is also presumably no 
residual value.  If, on the other hand, the money is spent on building new energy  
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infrastructure, the value of that infrastructure remains.  Does this mean that expenditures 
should be evaluated on a net basis, offsetting the cost against the gain in GDP and the 
value of the asset that remains?  Presumably yes, but valuing government investments is 
likely to be difficult and controversial.  
A similar issue is what remains along other dimensions of the economy when the 
stimulus program is finished.  For example, in the helicopter case what are the 
implications of the excess money supply that may remain after the close of the stimulus 
program?  In the fiscal context, the pressing concern in this regard is the impact of 
current deficits on outstanding national debt.  How burdensome will it be and how can 
this burden best be measured? 
 
Systemic Considerations 
A rationale for the broad Federal Reserve and U.S. Government response to the 
financial and economic crisis that erupted in 2008 was concern about the risk that large-
scale corporate failures would have on the integrity of the financial and economic system 
itself.  This is clearest in the case of the extensive (and expensive) bank bailouts, and in 
the industrial policy decision to bail out the automakers.  These considerations played 
less of a role in discussions of fiscal policy, although certainly one can imagine a severe 
situation where policies to reduce unemployment could be viewed as essential to 
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Simulating the ARRA and Policy Alternatives 
In this section, we use policy simulations to evaluate the economic impact of the 
ARRA program and to compare characteristics of alternative component policies.   As 
suggested above, our primary focus will be on employment effects, although we will 
touch on other elements as well.    
The economic effects are evaluated using the IHS Global Insight quarterly model 
of the United States economy.  (IHS Global Insight, undated.)  The IHS Global Insight 
model is a quarterly econometric forecasting and simulation system in the tradition of the 
Wharton models that describes the operation of the U.S. economy in great detail, 
encompassing over 1400 variables.  While the model strives to incorporate the best 
insights of many theoretical approaches to the business cycle—Keynesian, new 
Keynesian, neoclassical, monetarist, and supply-side—it follows traditional lines in many 
respects.  It is a modern Keynesian model with respect to the behavior of demand 
forces—consumption, investment, government spending, exports and imports—in the 
short run.  It incorporates aspects of supply-side and neoclassical growth (Solow) with 
focus on the economy’s supply side potential—labor force and productivity—in the long 
run.  Inflationary forces are captured by an augmented Phillips curve, monetary factors 
and exchange rates.  Prices adjust in response to gaps between production and supply 
potential and changes in the cost of inputs. The monetary sector determines the federal 
funds rate endogenously on the basis of the demand for money and the supply of 
reserves.  Other interest rates are linked to this rate plus expected inflation, Treasury 
borrowing, and sectoral credit requirements.    
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International competitiveness influences exports and imports, which serve as the 
primary links to the international economic environment.  Imports and exports are 
endogenous (eight categories of goods and service imports and exports are modeled with 
an additional goods category for oil imports).  The exchange rate of the U.S. dollar, 
which critically affects competitiveness given domestic prices, is endogenously 
determined. 
  The IHS Global Insight model system is used regularly for forecasting and policy 
simulation.  In our application of the system, we begin with a base solution, a recent 
forecast of the macroeconomy using the model.  This serves as our baseline.  Then we 
compute forecast alternatives, assuming changes in expenditures and taxes as in the 
proposed stimulus policy.  The effects are reported as differences between the alternative 
solutions and the baseline. 
 
The ARRA Program 
  We begin with a simulation of the overall ARRA program, a $787 billion package 
of tax cuts, transfers to persons and directly to state governments, and government 
spending.
4  The program was adopted in February 2009, with the bulk of the expenditures 
and tax benefits expected to be spent during 2009 and 2010, with some programs 
continuing into 2011 and beyond.   
  A problem from the start has been a relatively slow pace of outlays.  While tax 
cuts happened quickly, much of the spending was to be disbursed by the states.  This 
meant first that time was needed to allocate funds to the states.  Once allocations were 
                                                           
4 However, we exclude from this analysis the roughly $70 b. that represents an extension of middle class 
relief from the Alternative Minimum Tax.  These extensions have become routine in recent years.   
  11 
made the states were to disburse quickly to “shovel ready” projects.  But few projects 
were ready, and administrative approvals and meeting environmental regulations took 
considerable time to accomplish.  As a result, even those parts of the program that were 
intended for quick disbursement were delayed.  The recession deepened before offsetting 
spending was in place.  Moreover, a program that would have amounted to 5 percent of 
GDP if disbursed on a one-year basis, was spread over three years. 
  A summary of the ARRA program and estimates of the payout over the first six 
quarters is given in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 2.  The timing is based largely on 
Blinder and Zandi (2010), applied to our somewhat different estimates of the allocations 
of spending across categories.  Note that while personal and corporate tax cuts were 
implemented quickly, and virtually all of these funds were used by the middle of the first 
year, progress on spending has been much slower, with only 38% paid out by that time.
5   
If, in fact, multiplier impacts of spending are larger than for taxes, these delays are 
particularly worrisome.  
                                                           
5 In fact, delays may be even longer than these figures suggest because of slow spending by state 
governments of allocated funds.  In Hawaii, for example, the state had received $1.3 billion in awards by 
mid-2010, but only $585 million of that money had been used.    Roughly 75% of these expenditures were 
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Figure 2.  ARRA Allocations and Spend-out Through 2010Q2 
  
 
  The economic impact of the ARRA program as simulated in the IHS Global 
Insight model is summarized in Tables 2 and 3.  Table 2 shows the quarterly build up of  
impacts through 2010Q2, and Table 3 reports annual figures running out eight years.
6 
The ARRA program raises output 3.1% above base by the second quarter of 2010, 
producing 2.8 million additional jobs by that time.  (The employment impact peaks at 2.9 
million jobs in the following quarter.) The unemployment rate falls below baseline by 1.3 
percentage points.  (See Figure 3.)  These figures are similar to those obtained by other  
                                                           
6 For the period beyond 2010Q2, we have assumed a pace of continued ARRA spending that exhausts 
direct transfers to states by the first half of 2011 and government spending by the first half of 2012.   Total 
annual ARRA expenditures in our simulation are $315 billion in 2009, $249 b. in 2010, $94 b. in 2011 and 
$23 b. in 2012.  The current pace of Federal transfer payments to individuals suggests that all ARRA 
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researchers, if on the low side.  Romer and Bernstein (2009) estimated a net increase of 
3.7% in output and 3.7 million in employment by the end of 2010.  On an annual basis, 
Blinder and Zandi (2010) estimate that the ARRA (and some additional fiscal stimulus) 
will reduce the unemployment rate by 1.6 percentage points by 2011.  The Congressional 
Budget Office (2010) has estimated a range of 0.7-1.5 percentage point reduction in the 
unemployment rate by the first quarter of 2010; our estimate of 1.1 percentage points for 
that quarter lies in the middle of that range.   
Figure 3. U.S. Unemployment Rate Path With and Without ARRA 
 
 
While these effects are substantial, it is important to view them in the context of 
the significant output gap that existed at the depth of the recession. Using CBO estimates 
of the natural rate of unemployment (about 5%) and an Okun’s Law multiplier of 2, the 
U.S. economy had an output gap of about 10% at the end of 2009.  This is consistent with 
the estimates used in the IHS Global Insight model.  Other mainstream estimates are in  
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the 6-7.5% range (Kiley, 2010).  In our simulations annual ARRA spending peaks at 
$315 billion in 2009, just over 2% of GDP in that year.   Even with a substantial 
multiplier, spending on this scale can only be expected to close a fraction of the output 
shortfall.   
  The magnitude of multipliers in these model simulations presumably reflects in 
part their imposition during a period of extreme slack.  The impact on interest rates is 
quite small (about 50 basis points on the long rate), reflecting both a minimal policy 
interest rate response and an even more modest rise in long rates.  Presumably there is 
little resulting crowding out in this scenario, although this is difficult to assess because of 
the strongly pro-cyclical investment response.   
The net effect on the Federal budget deficit is much smaller than the nominal 
program cost because of multiplier effects.  By 2012, publically held debt rises by $485 
billion, compared with nominal spending of $681 billion over that time frame.  The 
debt/GDP ratio is just 2.1 percentage points higher than in the baseline.  This implies 
relatively low per-job costs when the overall budget impact is considered, as we will see 
below.   
Timing is an important consideration.  Despite the slow pace of spending, our 
simulations suggest that there was significant job creation by the second half of 2009: 
employment was 2 million above base in the fourth quarter and the unemployment rate 
0.9 percentage points lower.  Most of this was due to tax cuts and direct transfers to 
states, since government consumption and investment were very slow to come on line.  
As we have suggested above, one area of concern is the adverse impact on the 
economy of ARRA phase out over the next several years.  As shown in Table 3, this does  
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represent a significant drag on the economy in the 2013-1015 period.  Employment is 
600,000 below baseline in 2014 and the unemployment rate three tenths of a percentage 
point higher.  This is not severe enough to cause a new recession, but growth is certainly 
anemic during this period.  
 
Simulations of ARRA Components and Alternatives   
  The limited macroeconomic effects of the ARRA reflect both the limited size of 
the overall program and the delays in implementation discussed above.  They presumably 
also reflect the emphasis in the program on personal tax cuts and transfer payments as 
opposed to direct spending.  In this section we consider the differential impacts of a set of 
fiscal policies, using standardized policy simulations.  Our discussion will focus in 
particular on labor market effects, and will address the relative speed with which each 
policy is felt.   The simulated policies include the following: 
•  FISGC—Federal government non-military consumption spending 
•  FISGI—Federal government non-military investment spending 
•  PTAX—Federal personal current taxes (lump sum) 
•  PTRF—Federal personal current transfers 
•  FTRST—Federal transfers to state governments  
•  ITC—Federal investment tax credit 
 
Note that the first five simulations represent policies that form components of the ARRA 
package.  The final simulation, of a broad-based investment tax credit, is considered as a 
potential alternative policy, of interest primarily because of its potential for persistent 
positive effects on capital formation and productivity. Each policy is implemented as a 
permanent shock.  See the Appendix for details.  
  Table 4 reports standard real GDP multipliers for each of the alternative policies.    
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Table 4. Expenditure and Tax Multipliers     
Chg(Real GDP)/Chg(Real Policy Var)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5 
 FISGC  1.6  1.8  1.6  1.4  1.2 
 FISGI  1.5  1.8  1.6  1.5  1.4 
 FTRST  1.1  1.5  1.4  1.2  1.0 
 ITC  0.6  1.4  1.7  2.0  1.9 
 PTAX  0.6  1.1  1.1  1.0  0.9 
 PTRF  0.5  0.8  0.9  0.8  0.8 
           
 
As one would expect, government spending—whether for consumption or investment—
has a rapid and large multiplier effect, peaking at 1.8 in the second year of stimulus.  
Personal tax cuts and increases in transfer payments have smaller peak effects and also 
particularly weak effects in the first year.  The predominance of tax and transfer measures 
in the ARRA (they account for more than half of all spending) explains in part the 
relatively small initial effects.  Direct transfers to states fall between the expenditure and 
tax/transfer policies, with a multiplier greater than 1 in the first year, peaking at 1.5 in 
year two.  The relatively rapid and potent effect comes from the fact that a portion of 
these transfers flows directly into job creation or maintenance at the state level.
7  (In the 
ARRA, these funds were expressly intended to support health care spending and to avoid 
state layoffs of teachers, although revenues are fungible.)   Once job saving occurs, there 
are additional multiplier effects.  The alternative policy of investment tax credits has a 
large impact, but its peak effect comes very late.   
                                                           
7 Following Council of Economic Advisors (2009), we assume that of each dollar transferred to the states 
30 cents is used to avoid state tax increases that would otherwise have occurred and 60 cents is used to 
prevent state expenditure cuts, with the remaining 10 cents used to avoid a more rapid drawdown of state 
rainy day funds.  Of the expenditure change, we assume that half offsets layoffs and half is used to cushion 
cuts in state transfer payments, which are predominately Medicaid benefits.  These assumptions generate 
larger effects than the model’s normal endogenous response to Federal transfers, which generates much 
more delayed effects on output and especially employment. The latter seem unrealistic in the current 
environment where there is considerable pressure to avoid deep layoffs of state workers.   
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  The employment effects of the policies are summarized in Tables 5 and 6.  The 
table’s employment elasticities give the percentage increase in employment resulting 
from a one-percent-of-GDP change in the policy instrument.  Table 5 shows the response 
of employment over the first four quarters, with a five-year annual picture given by Table 
6. 
Table 5. Employment Elasticities (First Four Quarters) 
Percent change in employment for each 1% of GDP increase in policy variable 
         
       Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 
 FISGC  0.4  0.7  1.0  1.1 
 FISGI  0.4  0.7  1.0  1.2 
 FTRST  0.5  0.7  0.9  1.0 
 ITC  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.5 
 PTAX  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.5 
 PTRF  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4 
         
 
Table 6. Employment Elasticities (Annual Figures) 
Percent change in employment for each 1% of GDP increase in policy variable 
       Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5 
 FISGC  0.8  1.4  1.4  1.2  0.9 
 FISGI  0.8  1.4  1.5  1.2  1.0 
 FTRST  0.8  1.3  1.3  1.2  0.9 
 ITC  0.2  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.0 
 PTAX  0.3  0.8  0.9  0.8  0.8 
 PTRF  0.2  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.6 
           
 
The relative employment effects largely mirror the output effects of Table 4, but 
with a lag of about one year in most cases.  This reflects businesses’ tendency to delay 
hiring until revenue improvement is well underway.  Job creation is faster for spending 
policies than for taxes and transfers.  Investment tax credits have weak employment 
effects, presumably because of their bias toward capital inputs relative to labor.  Direct 
transfers to states have employment effects similar to direct Federal spending.  This  
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reflects in part our assumption of immediate employment effects on state worker 
payrolls, which may or may not be realistic in practice.
8 
 
Measuring the Cost of Job Creation   
The employment responses and budgetary impacts from the model simulations 
can be used to calculate alternative measures of the cost of job creation.   Table 7 reports 
the simple cost per job as the policy-related expenditure divided by the net increase in 
employment compared to the baseline.  Data are reported both for the second year of the 
simulation (year one figures are exceptionally high because of the lagged response of 
employment to spending) and averages for a three-year period.  In each case two costs are 
reported: (A) the cost measured as the increase in spending (the “nominal” cost) and (B) 
the cost measured as the change in the budget deficit.  
 
Table 7. Annual Cost Per Additional Job Created 
(includes induced private and public job creation) 
  Year 2    3-year Average 
 
A. Chg(Pol Var)/ 
Chg(empl) 
B. Chg(Fed Defciit)/ 
Chg(empl)   
A. Chg(Pol Var)/ 
Chg(empl) 
B. Chg(Fed Defciit)/ 
Chg(empl) 
 FISGC  $83,700  $28,900     $101,600  $48,100 
 FISGI  79,900  17,400    99,900  38,767 
 FTRST  91,200  25,700    109,067  43,500 
 ITC  143,900  74,100    239,333  170,200 
 PTAX  152,500  147,200    220,000  212,067 
 PTRF  200,100  143,000     278,400  213,033 
           
 
The annual nominal cost per job for government consumption and investment is 
in the vicinity of $80,000 in year two and $100,000 for the three-year average.  This 
                                                           
8 In the composite ARRA simulation of Table 1 to 3, we assume some lag in employment effects because 
of state budgeting and expenditure lags.  
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accords with estimates used as guidance to Federal agencies in reporting ARRA impacts.
9  
Council of Economic Advisors (2009) prescribes a figure of roughly $92,000 per job 
year. The CEA notes that while these may appear large compared with typical salaries, 
they implicitly include non-wage income and profit generated from the program.   Costs-
per-job are much higher for income taxes and transfers because of the late employment 
response and smaller multiplier effects.  (It is not clear why the transfers cost is so much 
higher than for personal tax cuts.)  For similar reasons an ITC is also a relatively 
expensive way to create new jobs—at least in the short run.  Costs for the direct transfers 
to states are only a bit higher than for direct government spending.  
  The nominal cost estimates overstate the budgetary costs of stimulus policies.  
Net costs are much lower when we consider the effect of the induced rise in economic 
activity on the Federal tax base and revenues.  Cost estimates fall by more than half to 
about $39,000 (three-year-average basis) for government investment and approximately 
$48,000 for government consumption.  The cost of job creation (job saving in the ARRA 
context) through direct transfers to states is $43,500 in these simulations.  Costs remain 
high for personal tax and transfer policies.   
 
Assessing Long-Term Implications 
Assessing the longer-term impacts of fiscal policies is complex and will be the 
subject of further work. One way to get a simple insight into the differing steady-state 
effects of alternative policies is to measure their effect on potential output a number of 
                                                           
9 This is not altogether surprising, since it is likely that CEA estimates were based in part on information 
from IHS Global Insight.  CEA (2009) reports that their multiplier estimates came from “averaging the 
multipliers for increases in government spending and tax cuts from a leading private forecasting firm and 
the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model” (page 11).  
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years down the road. Table 8 reports the percent deviation from base of real potential 
output five years out.   
 
Table 8. Increase in potential GDP, Year 5 
Percent change in potential GDP in year 5 for 
each 1% of GDP increase in policy variable 
        
 FISGC  0.2 
 FISGI  0.6 
 FTRST  0.2 
 ITC  1.1 
 PTAX  0.1 
 PTRF  0.0 
     
 
In the model, potential output growth is driven by assumptions about full-
employment labor force and productivity growth and endogenous growth of the capital 
stock through investment.  Policies that fail to raise the productive capital stock cannot 
have steady-state effects on the real economy.  So not surprisingly the only policies that 
raise potential output in these simulations are investment tax credits and to a smaller 
extent government investment.  Of course this view is probably overly simplistic, since 
presumably government spending in other areas—including education, social safety net 
programs, and grants for research and development—would be expected to affect 
potential output through their impact on human capital or on technological know how.  
These channels are not modeled here.    
The positive impact on potential output of public investment, or of programs that 
stimulate private sector investment, highlights an advantage of such programs as means 
of job creation.  In fact, it provides an additional reason that simple pecuniary measures 
of stimulus cost per job likely overstate the cost of job creation.  To the extent that public  
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programs add to productive capacity, the resulting output reduces the net cost of job 
creation compared to a case where job creation were entirely “make work.” 
As we suggested above, another important long-term issue is the debt burden left 
behind once a stimulus program has ended.  A comparison of annual interest payments 
associated with each policy five years out is reported in Table 9.   Accumulated debt and 
associated financing costs are higher for the relatively weak tax and transfer policies than 
with the more stimulative expenditure policies, particularly the investment-related 
policies.  Note that while this direct budgetary cost may be most important to 
policymakers, the relative burdens would be lower if one took into account the 
implications of rising output for the interest expense as a ratio to GDP.   
 
Table 9. Increase in Federal Interest Cost, Year 5 
Change in federal interest payments in year 5 for each 
1% of GDP increase in policy variable 
(Billions of 2005 dollars) 
        
 FISGC  31.0 
 FISGI  22.3 
 FTRST  33.4 
 ITC  22.0 
 PTAX  49.3 
 PTRF  48.5 




In this paper we have explored the issue of job creation by fiscal policy.  After 
reviewing the major issues, we have tried to obtain empirical estimates of job costs using 
simulations of the IHS Global Insight quarterly U.S. model.  We have evaluated the 
impact of the large ARRA program adopted in 2009, and we have assessed the relative  
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impacts of the major component policies as well as an investment tax credit alternative.   
Consistent with a number of other estimates, we find that Federal spending on 
government consumption and investment has a larger and more immediate impact on 
output and employment than the tax cut and transfer programs that represented a 
significant part of the ARRA programs.  However, the slow pace of “spend out” under 
the ARRA suggests that there are important practical impediments to a timely spending 
response.  An investment tax credit alternative would have large long-run effects but 
would be a poor option from the standpoint of near-term job creation.  Direct transfers to 
states have potentially large and immediate employment impacts; the inclusion in the 
ARRA of monies to relieve state fiscal distress was one of the relative success stories of 
the recent U.S. fiscal policy exercise. 
While we have measured the nominal and budgetary costs of job creation, we 
have largely sidestepped the more difficult question of whether these new jobs are “worth 
it.”  Are these costs outweighed by net benefits to society from the spending?  In some 
sense, one could argue that any macro policy with a multiplier greater than one meets this 
test, since the program more than pays for itself in higher output.  But this ignores the 
fact that there will be opportunity costs if public expenditure crowds out private activity 
(this is of less concern in a deep downturn than in more “normal” times).  In the present 
politically difficult budget climate there are also very real opportunity costs in that any 
particular fiscal expenditure very likely means some other program will not be funded. 
While it seems unlikely that a completely satisfactory cost-benefit accounting can be 
done for these broad macro policies, these issues nevertheless require a great deal more 
thought.    
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Another issue that deserves further attention is the long-term fiscal cost of job 
creation under these fiscal programs.  The direct interest cost is straightforward; 
estimating real impacts through higher borrowing costs, inflationary pressure, or 
borrowing premia will be more difficult to assess.   
Standing in late-2010, it is clear that the recovery to date has been sub-par, and 
the labor market in particular is likely to remain weak for a number of years.  Additional 
government stimulus may yet be needed.  This research demonstrates that alternative 
policy options have very different implications for the extent of job creation, as well as 





  27 
References 
Adams. F. Gerard and Byron Gangnes (forthcoming), “Why Hasn't the U.S. Economic 
Stimulus Been More Effective? The Debate on Tax and Expenditure Multipliers,” World 
Economics Volume Vol. 11, No. 4. 
 
Auerbach, Alan J. and William G. Gale (2010), “Activist Fiscal Policy,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives Vol. 24, No 4, Fall. 
 
Barro, Robert and Charles Redlick (2010), “Stimulus Spending Doesn't Work,”  The Wall 
Street Journal, undated, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471504574440723298786310.html. 
Accessed Oct. 5, 2010.  
 
Blinder, Alan S. and Mark Zandi (2010), “How the Great Recession was Brought to an 
End.”  New York: Moody’s Inc. 
 
Clark, Kenneth, Derek Leslie and Elizabeth Symons (1994), The Costs of Recession,” 
The Economic Journal, January, pp. 20-36. 
 
Cogan, John, Tobias, Cwik, John B. Taylor and Volker Wieland (2009), “New Keynesian 
versus Old Keynesian Government Spending Multipliers”, CEPR Discussion Paper 7236, 
March. 
 
Cogan, John and John Taylor (2010), “What The Government Purchases Multiplier 
Actually Multiplied in the 2009 Stimulus Package,” NBER Working Paper 16505, 
October.  
 
Congressional Budget Office (2009), “Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic Output as of September 2009,”  
November. http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10682/Frontmatter.2.2.shtml.  
Accessed Oct. 5, 2010. 
 
Council of Economic Advisors (2009), “Estimates of Job Creation From The American 
Recovery And Reinvestment Act of 2009,” May. 
 
Douglas, Stratford and Howard J. Wall (2000), “The Revealed Cost of Unemployment,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, March/April, pp. 1-10. 
  
Feldstein, Martin (1978), “The Private and Social Costs of Unemployment,” The 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 68, No. 2, May, pp. 155-158. 
 
Gordon, Robert J., William Nordhaus and William Poole (1973), “The Welfare Costs of 
Higher Unemployment,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1973, No. 1, pp. 
133-205. 
 
Hall, Robert E. (2009), “By How Much Does GDP Rise if the Government Buys More  
  28 
Output?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2009:2, pp. 183-249  
 
IHS Global Insight (undated), “Global Insight model of the U.S. economy,” Lexington, 
Massachusetts. 
 
IHS Global Insight (2009), “Fiscal Stimulus and the U.S. Economic Outlook: March 
Update,” April 3.  
 
Kiley, Michael T.  (2010), “Output Gaps,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 
2010-27, Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve 
Board, Washington, D.C. 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201027/201027pap.pdf (Accessed Oct. 7, 
2010.) 
 
Kletzer, Lori G. (1998), “Job Displacement,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Vol. 12, No. 1, Winter, pp. 115-136. 
 
Lucas, Robert E. (1987), Models of Business Cycles. Blackwell.   
  
Romer, Christina and Jared Bernstein (2009), “The Job Impact of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act,” January. 
http://otrans.3cdn.net/45593e8ecbd339d074_l3m6bt1te.pdf. Accessed October 5, 2010.  
 
Trades Union Congress, United Kingdom (2010), “The Costs of Unemployment,” 
briefing, Economic and Social Affairs Department, March. 
 
U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, Republican (2009), “Quick Facts on the 
Democrat Stimulus Proposal,” January 15. 
http://republicans.appropriations.house.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail
&PressRelease_id=64 Accessed October 10, 2010. 
 
Wall Street Journal (2009) “What’s in the Stimulus Bill?”  February 17. 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/STIMULUS_FINAL_0217.html. 
Accessed October 5, 2010.   
 
Wilson, Daniel J. (2010), “Fiscal Spending Jobs Multipliers: Evidence from the 2009 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
Working Paper 2010-17, September. 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2010/wp10-17bk.pdf . Accessed 
October 3, 2010. 
 
Woodford, Michael (2010), “Simple Analytics of the Government Expenditure 
Multiplier, Columbia University, June 13, 2010.  
  29 
Appendix.  Description of Policy Scenarios 
 
 




FISGC—$100 billion (2005 chained dollars) permanent increase in Federal government 
non-military consumption spending (exogenous assumption GFCOR) 
 
FISGI—$100 billion (2005 chained dollars) permanent increase in federal government 
non-military investment spending (exogenous assumption GFOGIR) 
 
PTAX—Approximately 1 percentage point reduction in the effective average Federal 
personal income tax rate; no change in marginal rates.  (Implemented using TXREBSUR 
policy lever.) 
 
PTRF—Permanent $100 billion increase in Federal transfers to persons: $50 b. in Social 
Security transfers (YPTRFGFSISS), $50 b. in other Federal transfers to persons 
(YPTRFGFO).  Implemented as addfactor adjustments.  
   
FTRST— Permanent $100 billion increase in Federal transfers to states: $50 billion in 
Medicaid funds and $50 billion in other Federal transfers.  (Implemented as 
corresponding increase in real transfers variables GFAIDSLSSMEDR and 
GFAIDSLOR.)  Assume states allocate $30 b. to Medicaid transfers (YPTRFGSLPAM, 
exogenized), $30 b. as a state personal income tax cut (TXPGSL, exogenized) and $30 b. 
as increase in state payroll spending (corresponding change to real variable GSLCWSSR, 
exogenized; deflator JPGSLCWSS also exogenized).  See footnote 7 for discussion.  
Some endogenous growth in nominal values occurs in the model.  
  
ITC—5 percentage point increase in Federal investment tax credit.  Gradually phased out 
beginning in year 6 to avoid model divergence.  Software category excluded because of 
model instability.   
 
ARRA Simulation—Combines component policies above, other than ITC, scaled to 
reflect magnitude and timing as summarized in Table 1.  Also includes cuts in effective 
corporate tax income tax rate (using lever RTXCGFRES).   State payroll spending 
component of FTRST effect phased in over first several quarters.   
 